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Overview

The events surrounding the withdrawal of a feeding tube from brain-damaged Terri 
Schiavo have highlighted the importance of health care planning. The lack of evidence 
concerning Schiavo’s intent with respect to the continuation or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
nutrition and hydration, complicated by the fact that she left no signed document or any 
clear previous oral statement, created a long and arduous legal battle among family members. 
Aside from the important policy implications of the Schiavo case, the case illustrates that 
health care planning in the event of incompetency should be a part of every estate plan.1 
Legal Issues Concerning the Medical Treatment of Incompetents 
Under common law, the mere touching of another person without consent and without 
legal justification constitutes a battery.2 As such, informed consent is generally required 
for medical treatment, and a physician performing a medical procedure without the patient’s 
consent commits a battery for which the physician may be held liable for resulting damages.3 
But, what if the patient is not competent to either consent to or refuse treatment? 
Advancements in medical technology have made possible the continuation of life beyond 
the point where natural forces would result in death, resulting in an increase in cases 
involving incompetent persons and the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 
Key court opinions.  In 1975, 21-year old Karen Ann Quinlan suffered severe brain 
damage and lapsed into a coma after mixing alcohol with valium at a party.  Karen’s father 
sought judicial approval to disconnect her respirator and the New Jersey Supreme Court 
granted the relief, holding that Karen had a constitutional right of privacy to terminate 
treatment.4 However, the court reasoned that the privacy right had to be balanced against 
asserted state interests.5 The court noted that the state’s interest weakens and the right to 
privacy strengthens as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.6 
The court also concluded that the only practical way to prevent the loss of Karen’s privacy 
right due to her incompetence was to allow her guardian and family to decide whether she 
would exercise it under the circumstances.7 After Quinlan, 8 most courts based a right to 
refuse treatment either solely on the common-law right to informed consent or on both the 
common law right and a constitutional privacy right.9 
In early 1983, 25-year old Nancy Cruzan lost control of her vehicle. The car overturned 
and Nancy was discovered lying face down in a ditch without detectable respiratory or 
cardiac function. Paramedics were able to restore her breathing and heartbeat at the accident 
site, and she was transported to a hospital in an unconscious state. She remained in a coma 
for about three weeks and then progressed to an unconscious state in which she was able 
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to orally ingest some nutrition. To ease feeding and aid recovery, 
surgeons implanted a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube with 
her husband’s consent.  Nancy’s brain-damaged condition was 
diagnosed as a “persistent vegetative state” – she was neither 
dead nor terminally ill. Medical experts testified that she could 
live another thirty years with nutrition and hydration, but her 
parents subsequently requested the hospital staff to remove the 
feeding tube. The staff refused to do so without court approval. 
The trial court authorized the removal of Nancy’s feeding tube, 
but the Missouri Supreme Court reversed on the basis that the 
Missouri Living Will statute10 indicated a strong state policy 
favoring the preservation of life.11 Because Nancy did not leave a 
written document comporting with the Living Will statute, her 
parents (as Nancy’s co-guardians) could not make the decision to 
remove Nancy’s feeding tube without clear and convincing 
evidence that the removal would have comported with Nancy’s 
desires. The court held that such evidence was not present.12 The 
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a state may apply a 
clear and convincing evidence standard in proceedings where a 
guardian seeks to disconnect nutrition and hydration of a person 
diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative state.13 Ultimately, 
Nancy’s parents were able to prove her desire not to live in a 
“persistent vegetative state” and Nancy died shortly after her 
feeding tube was removed. 
In 1990, 26-year old Terri Schiavo collapsed in her home when 
her heart temporarily stopped, cutting off oxygen to her brain 
and leaving her severely brain damaged. In late 1992, Terri’s 
husband won a medical malpractice lawsuit on the basis that 
doctors failed to diagnose the chemical imbalance that caused 
the heart attack.14 In 1993, Terri’s parents petitioned a court to 
have Terri’s husband removed as Terri’s guardian for conflict of 
interest reasons.15 The request was denied in 2001. Terri was not 
diagnosed as either terminally ill or brain-dead.16 A diagnosis that 
she was in a persistent vegetative state was later disputed by 
neurologists that concluded Terri was in a “minimally conscious 
state,”17 a neurological diagnostic criteria first defined in 2002.18 
In 1998, Terri’s husband petitioned a state trial court to have Terri’s 
feeding tube removed on the basis that Terri told him that she did 
not want life sustaining intervention in the event of her incapacity. 
In 2000, a Florida trial court judge (serving as the surrogate 
decisionmaker) ruled that the feeding tube could be removed, 
and the tube was subsequently removed in April of 2001 after the 
Florida Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge’s order.19 Two 
days later, a federal court issued a stay resulting in the reinsertion 
of the feeding tube.20 Later in 2001, the appellate court indefinitely 
delayed the removal of Terri’s feeding tube pending the 
examination of Terri by five physicians (two selected by Terri’s 
parents, two selected by Terri’s husband and one selected by the 
trial court).21 A month later, following an evidentiary hearing, the 
trial court judge again ordered the feeding tube removed. In late 
2003, following additional legal filings, the feeding tube was 
removed for a second time, and six days later the Florida 
legislature approved legislation authorizing the Governor to issue 
a one-time stay and order reinsertion of Terri’s feeding tube.22 
The Governor exercised this power and ordered the feeding tube 
to be reinserted. The provision, however, was later ruled 
unconstitutional.23 On March 18, 2005, Terri’s feeding tube was 
removed. Within hours, the Congress passed legislation, which 
the President signed into law, granting jurisdiction for de novo 
review of the case in the federal judiciary.24 The trial court refused 
to grant temporary injunctive relief,25 the appellate court 
affirmed,26 and the Supreme Court refused to hear the case.27 Terri 
died on March 31, 2005. 
Implications of the cases. While Cruzan28 established the 
constitutionally protected right to refuse medical treatment, it did 
not establish a federal standard as to how that right may be 
exercised, and it permitted the states to establish procedures 
limiting the methods of exercising such rights if the patient is 
incompetent.29 More importantly perhaps, persons who were 
previously competent but fail to express their desires in writing 
concerning life-sustaining medical treatment in the event of a 
subsequent incompetency, subject their guardians to legal 
proceedings (which may be contested and prolonged) where the 
guardian bears the burden of proof to establish the incompetent’s 
intent.30 Certainly, all three cases illustrate the importance of 
executing a written document comporting with applicable state 
law clearly expressing one’s intent with respect to artificial life 
support. 
Documenting health care desires.  Durable Powers of Attorney 
for Health Care (DPAHC) and Living Wills are the two primary 
devices for establishing personal wishes with respect to medical 
care. Most states have Living Will statutes, and all states have 
Durable Power of Attorney statutes that have been amended in 
recent years to include durable powers for health care decisions. 
Under the typical statutory provision, an adult may make a 
written declaration (i.e., a Living Will) of the desire not to have 
life-sustaining procedures induced upon a diagnosis of a terminal 
condition coupled with the inability to participate in the decision-
making process regarding treatment, and where the use of life-
sustaining procedures would merely prolong the dying process.31 
Practitioners should familiarize themselves with the statutory 
requirements for execution and witnessing of the declaration, and 
advise clients concerning the effectiveness of the declaration and 
the procedure for revoking the declaration.32 
Alternatively, one may sign a DPAHC.  A DPAHC is a signed, 
witnessed and notarized document that allows the person (as the 
principal) to designate an agent to make health care decisions on 
the person’s behalf in the event the person is unable to do so.33 
While much of the recent media attention surrounding the 
Schiavo case has focused on the need for a Living Will, the 
DPAHC clearly is the best and most flexible instrument to express 
one’s wishes regarding artificial life-sustaining medical treatment. 
The DPAHC can address a full range of medical problems, while 
most Living Will statutes apply only to patients who are terminally 
ill. Likewise, while a DPAHC may involve termination of 
treatment, it can also provide for aggressive care.34 A DPAHC 
may also serve the dual function of delegating a broad range of 
medical decision-making powers to an agent while simultaneously 
allowing the principal to exercise the constitutional right 
recognized in Cruzan. 35 
Conclusion 
Clearly, the most important lesson of Schiavo (and the Quinlan 
and Cruzan cases that preceded it) is that one’s desires concerning 
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life-sustaining medical treatment in the event of incompetency be 
reduced to writing and became part of the overall estate plan. 
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
ANIMALS 
CATTLE. The plaintiff owned an irrigated corn field which 
adjoined the defendant’s land. The properties were separated by a 
“lawful fence” and a one-wire electric fence; however, the 
defendant’s cattle broke through the fence and spread out over the 
irrigated field which had immature corn growing on it at the time. 
Although the defendant agreed to pay for the damage to the crop, 
a fertilizer tank and the loss of fertilizer, the parties disagreed as to 
the measure of damages. The plaintiff argued that the damages 
were calculated by comparing the yield of the non-damaged crops 
and the yield of the damaged area. The plaintiff harvested the areas 
separately and measured the difference in yield to support its 
damage claim. The trial court allowed the plaintiff damages only 
for the cost of rent of a pasture for one day because it found that 
the plaintiff failed to prove the loss of value of the crop on the day 
the damage occurred, not later when the crop was harvested. The 
appellate court held that the proper measure of damages was the 
difference in yield reduced by any reduced costs.  Because the 
plaintiff continued to irrigate, fertilize and harvest the entire field, 
the costs were not reduced by the damage; therefore, the damages 
were equal to the loss of yield in the damaged field. Harsh v. 
Cure Feeders, LLC, 2005 Colo. App. LEXIS 842 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2005).
   FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAMS 
CROP INSURANCE. The plaintiffs were Texas, Georgia, 
Alabama, Florida, and South Carolina peanut farmers who insured 
their 20 01-2002 peanut crops under Multiple Peril Crop 
Insurance (“MPCI”) policies. The plaintiffs’ crops suffered 
weather-related damage in 2002 and the plaintiffs filed insurance 
claims for the losses. The loss claims were allowed using the 
non-quota peanut per-pound coverage rate of $0.1775 as provided 
under the 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act, Pub. 
L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 182 (2002). The 2002 removed the 
distinction between quota and non-quota peanuts and set the rate 
at $0.1775 per pound. The plaintiffs sued in the Court of Federal 
Claims for breach of contract in that the insurance policies were 
formed when the coverage rate for quota peanuts was $0.31 per 
pound. The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and 
refused to transfer the case to the Federal District Court. The 
plaintiffs argued that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction 
under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), because the suit 
did not name the FCIC as a defendant. The court rejected this 
argument because the FCIC was the true defendant in this case 
because the crop insurance policies are between the FCIC and 
the plaintiffs. However, the court held that the case should have 
been transferred to the Federal District Court because the failure 
to transfer caused the loss of the claims due to a statute of 
limitations and because the transfer would not prejudice any party 
or unduly burden the courts. Texas Peanut Farmers v. United 
States, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 9881 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
IRRADIATION OF FRUITS AND VEGETABLES. The 
APHIS has issued proposed regulations to revise the approved 
doses for irradiation treatment of imported fruits and vegetables. 
This proposed regulations establish a new minimum generic dose 
of irradiation for most arthropod plant pests, establish a new 
minimum generic dose for the fruit fly family, reduce the 
minimum dose of irradiation for some specific fruit fly species, 
and add nine pests to the list of pests for which irradiation is an 
approved treatment. In addition, the proposed regulations provide 
for the irradiation of fruits and vegetables moved interstate from 
